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The crisis enveloping global financial markets since August 2007 was 
triggered  by  actual  and  prospective  credit  losses  on  US  mortgages. 
Was the United States just unlucky to have been the first to experience 
a  housing  crisis?  Or  was  it  inherently  more  susceptible  to  one?  I 
examine  the  limited  international  evidence  available,  to  ask  how  the 
boom- bust cycle in the US housing market differed from elsewhere and 
what  the  underlying  institutional  drivers  of  these  differences  were. 
Compared with other countries, the United States seems to have: built 
up a larger overhang of excess housing supply; experienced a greater 
easing in mortgage lending standards; and ended up with a household 
sector  more  vulnerable  to  falling  housing  prices.  Some  of  these 
outcomes  seem  to  have  been  driven  by  tax,  legal  and  regulatory 
systems  that  encouraged  households  to  increase  their  leverage  and 
permitted lenders to enable that  development. Given the institutional 
background, it may have been that the US housing boom was always 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  crisis  enveloping  global  financial  markets  since  August  2007  was 
triggered by actual and prospective credit losses on US mortgages. Could the 
crisis have started in another country’s mortgage market as easily? There were 
so  many  other  countries  and  markets  where  credit  was  booming  and  asset 
prices have been high. In many other countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom, housing prices were rising even more 
rapidly. Many observers at the time believed that this meant that the United 
States was less vulnerable to a housing bust than those other countries. The 
losses  were  propagated  through  the  global  financial  system  via  trading  in 
mortgage-backed  securities  (MBS)  and  related  structured  finance  products; 
this  propagation  of  the  crisis  is  not  the  subject  of  this  paper.  Rather,  the 
question posed here relates to the underlying defaults, and why they occurred 
in US mortgages, but not those from other countries.  
 
I  examine  the  background  to  the  recent  developments  in  the  US  housing–
finance system,  draw out some of the unusual features of this system, and 
compare  with  those  in  the  other  countries  mentioned  above.  Based  on  this 
evidence, I conclude that the US mortgage market was uniquely vulnerable to 
the  prospect  of  its  boom  ending  badly.  An  autonomous  escalation  of 
delinquencies and defaults –that is, before a macroeconomic downturn– was 
not equally likely in all markets that had boomed in response to easy credit 
conditions.  
 
The  housing  construction  boom  itself  helped  create  this  vulnerability.  In 
contrast  to  some  other  countries,  strong  housing  demand  was  met  with 
additional supply that exceeded underlying needs. When the boom stopped, the 
United States was left with an overhang of excess supply that other countries 
have not built up. In addition, the easing in US lending standards seems to 
have  gone  further  than  elsewhere,  across  a  number  of  dimensions  such  as 
documentation  standards,  loan-to-valuation  (LTV)  ratios  (including  second 
mortgages) and loans where principal was not paid down in the early stages of 
their lives. An unusually large fraction of long-standing homeowners therefore 
ended up with no or negative equity in their properties. As a result, mortgage 
arrears rates rose in the United States earlier than might have been anticipated 
given the past experience of other countries. Remarkably, the rise in arrears 
rates happened before the traditional triggers of a macroeconomic downturn 
and tighter lending standards.  
 
After documenting these aspects of recent developments in the next section, I 
turn  in  Section  3  to  examining  the  institutional  arrangements  in  the  US 
housing–finance system that might help explain the housing meltdown in the 
United  States.  I  argue  that  differences  in  the  responsiveness  of  the 
homebuilding sector, the tax and legal systems, financial regulation and the 
mortgage  market  all  contributed  to  the  housing  meltdown.  Many  of  these 353    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
factors were long-standing features of the US system, but they interacted with 
the easing in credit conditions to amplify its effect, in ways that were perhaps 
not anticipated at the time.  
 
The policy implications of these observations are discussed in Section 4. The 
first of these is that home mortgage markets outside the United States were 
very unlikely to have been the trigger for a financial crisis. Higher household 
indebtedness  could  exacerbate  the  effects  of  a  macroeconomic  downturn 
sparked by some other shock. But the household sectors in non-US economies 
were unlikely to have been the initial source of the shock.  
 
The second main policy lesson is that housing markets are inherently prone to 
price cycles because the supply of housing stock is inherently sticky. Not all 
price booms are actually driven by speculative bubbles, at least initially, and it 
could be damaging to policy credibility to treat all such booms as being the 
result of bubbles. Another aspect of the stickiness of housing supply is that 
when extra supply does come onto the market, it remains in existence even if 
demand  falls  away  again.  This  leads  to  the  third  main  policy  lesson,  that 
housing  markets  can  be  vulnerable  to  the  effects  of  a  temporary  excessive 
easing on lending standards for home mortgages. When lending standards ease 
in a way that is not sustainable, housing demand rises and extra homes are 
built.  The  extra  supply  will  result  in  prices  undershooting  the  earlier 
equilibrium  when  lending  standards  tighten  again.  Economies  with  more 
flexible housing supply, such as the United States, therefore risk having more 
painful busts even though their boom phases look smaller viewed through the 
lens of housing prices.  
 
The implication for regulatory policy is that in countries where housing supply 
is  especially  flexible,  or  where  tax  and  other  institutional  arrangements 
encourage  households  to  carry  more  debt  than  they  otherwise  would,  it 
becomes even more important to financial stability to ensure that the debt was 
prudently lent. It may be that these countries should regulate mortgage lending 
practices even more tightly than countries that lack these features, or at least 
monitor housing markets especially closely for signs of imbalances.  
 
 
2.  The  Narrative:  What  Happened  Differently  in  the 
United States? 
 
2.1  The Construction Boom Created Excess Supply 
 
US  housing  construction  peaked  in  early  2006.  By  the  end  of  that  year, 
housing starts had fallen by around 40%. The decline was at that point broadly 
in line with past downturns in the United States and some other countries, such 
as  Australia  or  Canada  (Figure  1,  left-hand  panel).  Unlike  those  earlier 
episodes, however, this time the United States has ended up with an overhang Ellis    354 
 
 
of excess supply. This is evidenced by the proportion of vacant homes for sale, 
especially  for  houses  built  since  2000,  which  is  not  apparent  in  the  other 
countries  shown.  (Figure  1,  right-hand  panel).  In  many  of  those  countries, 
governments and other observers have been concerned about a lack of housing 
supply.
1 The ratio of housing construction to GDP might have been lower in 
the US boom than in  some  other countries, but it seemed that new supply 
exceeded underlying housing demand by more. Focusing on this ratio alone 
can  be  misleading:  demand  fundamentals  such  as  income  and  population 
growth determine how much construction is sustainable, in order to achieve 
the desired housing stock.  
 
 
Figure 1  Housing Construction and Vacant Homes 
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Note: 
a
. Vacancy rate is the number of homes that are vacant and for sale as a percentage 
of homes that are either owner-occupied or vacant and for sale.  
Sources: National Sources, DataStream. US housing vacancies data are available from 
the  Census  Bureau,  at  http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/hvs.htm  and  at 




The  standard  analysis  of  housing  demand  recognizes  that  it  consists  of  a 
demand for a certain number of dwellings, and separately for their average 
quality – the housing services that each provides. Housing construction adjusts 
the stock over time to match demand (Egebo, Richardson and Lienert 1990). 
New dwellings are needed to accommodate population growth and to replace 
older stock that does not match households’ quality expectations as incomes 
rise. So construction of new dwellings should be higher in countries with high 
population growth and also where income is growing rapidly, since this will 
boost both household formation rates and the desire to replace the older stock 
                                                        
1In the United Kingdom, the government commissioned the Barker Review of Housing 
Supply (Barker 2004). In Australia, concerns about housing supply and affordability led 
to inquiries by the Productivity Commission in 2003 (Productivity Commission 2004) 
and by a Senate Select Committee in 2008.  355    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
that offers a lower level of  housing  services. Similarly, in countries  where 
household income is growing rapidly, construction can be expected to include 
high  levels  of  renovation  and  an  increasing  average  quality  of  newly  built 
homes. 
 
We can compare the US housing construction boom to those in other countries 
in  light  of  these  factors.  Figure  2  shows  that  between  2001  and  2006,  the 
United States built more new homes than would seem to have been required by 
the growth in its population. In contrast, countries such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom and Spain barely managed to build enough homes to keep up with 
growth in the number of households. Only in Ireland was the gap between 
growth in the dwelling stock and in the number of households larger than the 
gap in the United States. The difference in Ireland  might partly reflect the 
dwelling stock catching up to earlier increases in the number of households. 
Average household size in Ireland fell significantly over the past two decades; 
it  is  still  above  the  average  in  other  industrialised  countries.  The  excess 
addition  to  the  US  housing  stock  cannot  be  reconciled  to  demographic 
fundamentals in this way. 
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Average Annual Growth in GDP per Capita 
Note: 
a
 US = United States; ES = Spain; GB = Great Britain (Excludes Northern Ireland); 
IE = Ireland; AU = Australia; CA= Canada.
*Dwellings growth for Canada refers 
to occupied dwellings only. 
Sources:  National  Sources,  DataStream.  The  figures  on  average  household  size  in 
Ireland  are  from  the  Irish  Central  Statistics  Office,  and  are  available  at 
http://www.cso.ie/census/. The Spanish housing price growth figures referred here are 
the  national  index  (DataStream  code  ESHOUPRCF)  and  national  price  per  square 
metre (DataStream code ESHOUSE.A), both of which recorded growth of around 2% 
over the year to the second quarter of 2008, and a slight fall in the quarter. The regional 
and  city-level  prices  were  obtained  directly  from  the  website  of  the  Ministerio  de 
Vivendia. 
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The  US  housing  boom  also  involved  substantial  renovation  of  the  existing 
housing stock and an increase in the average quality of (detached) houses that 
seems  large  compared  with  its  past  relationship  with  income  growth.  For 
example, the median floor space of newly built single-family homes in the 
United States increased at an average annual rate of around 1.6% over the 
period 2000–2006.
2 This  was  roughly double the rate seen over the 1990s, 
when real household income growth had been faster. Moreover, unlike past 
and current booms elsewhere, the recent US housing boom did not seem to 
have any impetus from optimism about household income growth. Ireland and 
Spain have clearly been on convergence paths where a period of rapid growth 
in incomes could be expected. Optimism about incomes growth (warranted or 
otherwise) also seems to have been one of the triggers of the booms in the 
United  Kingdom,  Australia  and  the  Nordic  countries  in  the  late  1980s 
(Attanasio  and  Weber,  1994,  Drees  and  Pazarbasiouglu,  1998).  No  such 
optimism can be discerned either in the US household surveys or in the recent 
actual US data.  
 
The excess supply in the United States can be quantified approximately using a 
simple stock-adjustment relation. Suppose the desired housing stock at time t, 
Ht*, depends on the population (POPt) and the desired housing services per 
capita,  which  (in  the  absence  of  relative  price  shifts  or  any  effects  from 
changes in the average household size) will depend on per capita income (Yt) 
and the (assumed constant) rate at which housing stock per capita converts into 
housing services, α. The result is the equilibrium relation shown in (1). The 
change  in  the  desired  stock  therefore  depends  on  population  and  income 
growth, as in (2).  
     t t t POP Y H α =
*                                                      (1)  
                            
t t t t t POP Y Y POP H ∆ + ∆ = ∆ α α
*                                (2) 
A change in the desired stock would not be expected to be satisfied with new 
construction in a single year; any current deviation between the actual housing 
stock (Ht) and the desired one (Ht*) would also be only partially met. Actual 
construction  ∆Ht  can  therefore  be written  as (3), where  β  and  γ  are  partial 
adjustment factors. The third term on the right-hand side captures the fact that 
some construction is needed to offset the physical depreciation (at rate δ) of 
the existing housing stock.  




1 − − − + ∆ + − = ∆ t t t t t H H H H H δ β γ                    (3) 
Dividing  through by real GDP (Yt
  × POPt) gives an equation for the share of (real) 
construction in GDP (4), which can be regressed on actual data. Since this is 
an equation capturing adjustments back to long-run equilibrium, we use four-
quarter-ended changes of population and income and treat the fraction with 
                                                        
2  US  floorspace  data  are  from  the  US  Census  Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/const/C25Ann/sftotalmedavgsqft.pdf. 357    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
GDP growth in the denominator as a constant, evaluated at its average over the 
whole sample. We also omit from this simple exercise shorter-run factors such 
as interest rates and deviations of relative prices from their long-run average. 
(The  symbol  ∆  with  lower-case  variables  denotes  proportionate  changes – 


















βα βα γα        (4) 
To recover the underlying parameters α, β, and γ, we require an assumption for 
δ, which we take from US Census Bureau data on average depreciation rates 
for  the  housing  stock.  This  depreciation  rate  is  also  used  to  estimate  the 
housing  stock  in  each  period  Ht,  using  a  recursive  calculation  cumulating 
actual construction, less depreciation, from a starting value based on Census 
Bureau housing stock estimates.
3 The parameters on population and income 
growth were not forced to be equal, so the partial adjustment factors could differ 
depending on whether the desired stock was changing because of population 
growth (number of houses) or income growth (average quality of housing).  
 
With these estimated underlying parameters in hand, we can determine how 
quickly  construction  catches  up  to  a  change  in  fundamentals  on  average 
(estimated βs), and whether this behavior changed during the recent housing 
construction boom. Given the housing stock in 2000 and an average population 
growth of around 1% per annum over the period 2000–06, the relationship 
between income growth and the normal share of housing construction in real 
GDP (estimated over 1972–2000) is as shown by the black line in the right-
hand panel of Figure 2. Average growth in income per capita over the period 
2000–2006 was 1.4%, so the historically typical stock adjustment rate could 
have been achieved with an annual average ratio of housing construction to 
GDP of 3.8%, as shown by the black dot on top of the line. The actual average 
over the period, shown as the black square, was 4.9%. This difference implies 
significant excess construction compared with historical behavior: indeed, the 
out-of-sample  forecast  errors  over  2000–06  are  large,  in  contrast  to  the 
regression’s reasonable in-sample fit. 
 
As a counterfactual exercise, applying the same coefficients to Spain’s higher 
population  growth  and  lower  initial  housing  stock  implies  an  average 
relationship between income growth and housing construction more like the 
grey line in the figure.
4 The grey dot shows the point corresponding to Spain’s 
                                                        
3 We (Garcia and Ellis) do not use the Census Bureau estimates for the whole period 
because they do not line up with the construction data we are modelling, especially 
around Census dates. 
4These calculations are moderately sensitive to the assumption about the initial housing 
stock to GDP ratio. For Spain, this is calculated based on estimates of the housing stock 
(excluding land) for 2000, taken from Naredo, Carpintero and Marcos (2005). The line 
would still be above that for the United States unless the housing stock per unit of GDP Ellis    358 
 
 
actual average income growth over 2000–07 (2.4%). The actual outcome for 
the construction–GDP ratio, shown by the grey square, is higher than this, but 
the gap is smaller than for the United States. It cannot be completely ruled out 
that  some  overbuilding  has  occurred  in  Spain,  but  clearly,  most  of  the 
difference between the two countries’ ratios of housing construction to GDP 
can be explained by different fundamentals.  
 
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the counterfactual exercise 
assumes that construction fundamentals in Spain are explained by the same 
model as in the United States. This assumption might not be realistic given the 
range of other fundamentals implying that Spain’s equilibrium housing stock 
has  increased  in  recent  years.  These  include:  the  permanent  down-shift  in 
nominal  interest  rates  (and  increase  in  borrowing  capacity)  associated  with 
euro entry; the faster decline in household sizes; and the importance of non-
residents’ second homes in Spain compared with the United States. 
 
Spain has also entered into a sharp housing downturn recently, but the effect 
on housing prices has been quite drawn out. Four years after the peak rate of 
price  growth  was  recorded,  the  level  of  nationwide  housing  prices  finally 
peaked  in  the  second  quarter  of  2008.  Despite  a  severe  recession,  housing 
prices only fell by around 10% in the following year (to Q1:2009), compared 
with a peak-to-trough move of more than 30% in the United States, according 
to  some  measures.  The  conclusion  from  this  and  from  the  simple  exercise 
shown  in  Figure  2  therefore  has  to  be  that  the  downturn  in  housing 
construction in Spain started from a position of less (or even no) oversupply, in 
contrast to the US situation.  
 
2.2  Lending Standards Seem to Have Eased More in the United States 
 
Mortgage lending standards eased in many countries in recent years, but the 
process seems to have gone further in the United States. Standards are difficult 
to measure because different aspects need not all move together (Gorton 2008, 
Bhardwaj  and  Sengupta  2008),  but  the  observed  increase  in  early  payment 
defaults in the United States (but not elsewhere) provides direct evidence that 
it  occurred  (Kiff  and  Mills  2007);  Gerardi,  Lehnert,  Sherlund  and  Willen 
(2008) provide additional detail on the easing in lending standards.  
 
In addition, that US mortgage lending standards eased more than elsewhere is 
evidenced  by  a  number  of  specific  products  and  developments  seen  in  the 
United States but not in other countries that experienced housing price booms 
over this period, or at least not to anywhere near the same extent. Only in the 
United  States  were  negative  amortisation  mortgages  available,  along  with 
“silent seconds” (undisclosed second mortgages) and downpayment assistance 
charities, often funded by vendors. Likewise, only in the United States did 
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certain markers of fraudulent behaviour, such as appraisal fraud, the use of 
straw buyers, and the “renting” of credit scores, become so widespread.  
 
Two developments seem to have spurred the easing in US standards. First, a 
range  of  legislative  and  policy  changes  had  been  made  to  encourage  the 
development of a non-conforming (Alt-A and subprime) lending sector, lying 
outside the  model defined by the government-sponsored  enterprises (GSEs, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Part of the motivation for this was a desire to 
ensure that home ownership was accessible to households who had historically 
been  under-served  by  mortgage  lenders  (Gramlich  2007).  In  addition,  the 
administration had wanted to reduce the GSEs’ domination of the mortgage 
market.  Following  problems  with  accounting  and  governance  at  both 
institutions,  the  GSEs’  capacity  to  expand  lending  was  capped  by  new 
regulatory limits on their activities (Kiff and Mills 2007, Blundell-Wignall and 
Atkinson 2008).5  
 
Second, origination volumes had fallen following the end of the refinancing 
wave of 2003. Lenders therefore faced a substantial reduction in fee income, 
with implications for the size of the entire industry. The low rates on long-term 
fixed-rate  mortgages  available  in  2003  had  allowed  borrowers  to  cut  their 
interest rate significantly, by one-fifth on average for loans refinanced with 
Freddie Mac, for example. Total originations peaked at around $4 trillion, with 
MBS issuance not much less than that (Figure 3, left-hand panel).
6 As a result, 
around half the outstanding mortgage stock turned over in that year, either 
through  moving  or  refinancing.  According  to  the  Federal  Reserve’s  2004 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 45% of households with a first mortgage had 
refinanced  within  the  previous  three  years  (Bucks,  Kennickell  and  Moore 
2006).  
 
Rather than see the industry shrink, lenders responded by easing underwriting 
standards  across  several  dimensions.  The  first  of  these  was  that  non-
conforming  mortgages  did  indeed  gain  market  share.  Subprime  loan 
origination  grew  particularly  strongly,  but  the  Alt-A  category  did  as  well 
(Figure 3). Much of the expansion occurred in lending originated by specialist 
lenders. This shift included entry into the market by major investment banks 
via newly acquired mortgage-lending subsidiaries. Even if lenders within each 
category had not eased standards, the result would have been that more of the 
                                                        
5Contrary  to  some  media  commentary,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  Community 
Reinvestment  Act  was  responsible  for  encouraging  the  subprime  lending  boom  and 
subsequent housing bust. This Act only applies to depositories, and did not cover most 
of  the  important  subprime  lenders.  Depositories  showed  a  lesser  tendency  to  write 
subprime loans than lenders not subject to the Act (Yellen 2008). 
6Freddie  Mac’s  refinancing  data  are  available  from  their  statistical  release  page: 
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/data.html.  The  figure  for  total  mortgage 
originations in 2003, also on this page, was taken from the trade publication Inside 
Mortgage Finance. Ellis    360 
 
 
US mortgage book contained features that raised delinquency and default rates. 
As documented by Quercia, Stegman and Davis (2007), even in the late 1990s, 
loans originated by designated subprime lenders were much more likely than 
prime lending to include features that boost default rates, such as prepayment 
penalties and balloon payments. 
 
 




























Repayment to Income ratio (rhs)
 % Low-doc (rhs)
Total LTV (lhs)
Subprime lending standards (in percent)
 
In trillions of US dollars;   Figure for 2008 is for the first quarter, annualised. 
Sources: Left Panel – UBS; Right Panel – Reproduced from Table 1 in Demyanyk and 
Van Hemert (2007). 
 
 
The easing in US mortgage lending standards went beyond a shift amongst 
lenders with different business models. An array of statistical evidence and 
legal findings shows that underwriting standards of individual lenders eased as 
well. First, and perhaps most importantly, requirements for documentation of 
income and assets became progressively laxer. Instead of assessing borrowers’ 
abilities to service their loans, lenders ended up focusing on collateral values, 
in effect betting on rising housing prices (Gorton (2008) makes a similar point).  
 
Figure 3 (right-hand panel) shows that amongst securitised subprime loans, the 
share of 2001 originations that were “low-doc” stood at around 30%. For the 
2006  cohort,  the  share  increased  to  more  than  half  (Demyanyk  and  Van 
Hemert 2007). Amongst Alt-A pools of loans, the picture is even starker: only 
around 40% of fixed-rate mortgages and one-quarter of Alt-A adjustable-rate 
mortgages (ARMs) had full documentation as at May 2008
7. While low-doc 
(self-certified) mortgages are available in the United Kingdom and Australia, 
they  have  been  much  more  prevalent  in  the  United  States.  In  2005,  low-
documentation loans represented around 10% of new and 5% of outstanding 
                                                        
7 The figures for full documentation on Alt-A loans comes from the Federal Reserve of 
New  York’s  analysis  of  a  1%  sample  of  LoanPerformance  data,  available  at 
http://newyorkfed.org/regional/US_May.xls , accessed 3 July 2008. 361    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
mortgages in Australia (RBA 2005b), compared with more than one quarter of 
US mortgages originated in recent years, as the above-mentioned figures imply.  
 
Second, the sustained period of low US policy rates also made ARMs more 
attractive to borrowers relative to fixed-rate loans in the short term. There was 
a substantial shift of the US  mortgage book into  ARMs, in contrast to the 
pattern of the previous several decades. Some ARM products were rendered 
even more attractive to borrowers by their low introductory “teaser” interest 
rates.  
 
Comprehensive information on the size of rate discounts is not available, but it 
seems  that  they  were  deeper  in  the  United  States  than  elsewhere,  whether 
currently  or  in  earlier  periods  of  increased  competition.  For  example,  new 
mortgage  lenders  funding  themselves  through  securitisation  entered  the 
Australian  mortgage  market  in  the  mid-1990s,  increasing  competition.  The 
“honeymoon”  teaser  interest  rates  they  offered  were  only  about  0.5–1.5 
percentage points below the standard variable home loan rates to which they 
would reset (RBA 1999c, page 30). Data published by the Bank of England 
suggest  that  in  the  United  Kingdom,  discounted  rates  are  also  only  a  little 
below standard variable interest rates. By contrast, teaser rates on US subprime 
loans  tended to be around 3– 4 percentage  points below the rate to which  the 
mortgage would reset (given unchanged market rates) and the gap was at least 
as large for prime ARMs. There is little evidence that resets were a major 
factor in the initial increase in delinquencies and foreclosures: the largest wave 
of  subprime  resets  occurred  in  2008  or  later  (Cagan  2007,  Foote,  Gerardi, 
Goette and Willen 2008a). Nonetheless, the larger gap between teaser and reset 
rates provides indirect evidence that US lenders eased standards more than 
lenders elsewhere.  
 
A third element of the US easing in credit standards was the increased use of 
second  mortgages,  whether  at  purchase  (a  “piggyback”)  or  subsequently 
(usually a home equity line of credit). The prevalence of home equity loans 
had already increased from less than 5% in 2001 to 8.6% in 2004, according to 
the  Federal  Reserve’s  Survey  of  Consumer  Finances.  In  subsequent  years, 
piggyback loans became increasingly common (Avery, Brevoort and Canner 
2007, GAO 2007), in part because they were more attractive than paying for 
mortgage insurance (see Section 3.2). Many US households seem to have been 
able to obtain 100% financing in this way, which enabled higher overall LTV 
ratios at origination. In other countries, explicit (insured) 100% financing is 
normally necessary.  
 
In  addition,  Ashcraft  and  Schuermann  (2008)  cite  LoanPerformance  data 
showing  that  many  of  these  piggyback  loans  were  not  disclosed  to  the 
originator of the  first  mortgage. These so-called  “silent  second liens”  were 
very rare in the 1990s, accounting for much less than 1% of subprime and Alt-
A loans originated in 1999. But by 2006, more than one-quarter of securitised Ellis    362 
 
 
subprime  and  nearly  40%  of  securitised  Alt-A  first  mortgages  had  a  silent 
second. The associated first mortgages must therefore have been mispriced, 
because the originator did not know the borrower’s true LTV ratio, and thus 
their true risk. There is no evidence that silent seconds (as opposed to second 
mortgages that the lender knows about) exist in any significant numbers in 
other countries.  
 
A  fourth,  related,  element  was  that  initial  LTV  ratios  on  new  mortgages 
increased  substantially,  and  explicit  100%  financing  became  much  more 
common. Cagan (2007) estimates that around 18% of mortgages originated in 
2006 were in negative equity by the end of that year, suggesting an initial LTV 
ratio at or close to 100%. This development  was  not  unique to the United 
States: mortgages for 100% or more of valuation also became more prevalent 
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in recent years, for example. But 
even in these countries, borrowers with initially high LTV ratios remained a 
small minority of the total during the first half of this decade (Benito 2006). 
Moreover,  these  were  countries  where  high-LTV  ratio  financing  had  been 
available  for  many  years.  As  Tsatsaronis  and  Zhu  (2004)  identify,  the  US 
mortgage  system  had  previously  tended  to  lend  at  more  conservative  LTV 
ratios and for fixed rates, so this constituted a greater net easing in standards 
there.  
 
Effective LTV ratios also rose because many US buyers were not using their 
own funds for the downpayment they did make. Third-party contributions to 
fund downpayments seem to have become  widespread, especially  for  more 
marginal  borrowers.  Downpayment  assistance  eases  the  credit  constraint 
represented  by  downpayment  requirements;  contributions  by  friends  and 
family have long been used for this purpose (Mayer and Engelhardt 1996). 
More recently, though, sellers started providing funds, sometimes channelled 
via charities, in lieu of an actual downpayment. This gave rise to concerns that 
prices were being inflated by the amount of the assistance, and that the credit 
quality of the mortgages was less than those where the downpayment came 
from the borrower’s own funds (Concentrance Consulting Group 2005). In any 
case,  if  funds  for  downpayments  are  available  from  sources  other  than  the 
buyers’ own savings, their incentives to negotiate with the seller to reduce an 
inflated  price  are  substantially  lessened.  The  actual  transacted  price  could 
therefore have been inflated, giving lenders false comfort about the true loan-
to-valuation ratio.
8 
                                                        
8 Seller-financed down payments are not a fringe product in the US mortgage market, 
but are essentially unheard of elsewhere. They have grown to one-third of the Federal 
Housing Administration’s (FHA) insured portfolio, and are three times more likely to 
go into foreclosure than other FHA mortgages (Montgomery 2008). In late 2007, the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) tried to ban the use of such assistance from 
seller-financed charities for FHA-insured mortgages. After this ban was blocked by a 
court injunction in early 2008, the practice was finally banned by the Housing Rescue 




Finally, interest-only and negative amortisation loans became more prevalent 
in  the  United  States  in  recent  years.  According  to  LoanPerformance  data, 
33.7% of securitised purchase loans originated in the first quarter of 2007 were 
interest-only and a further 7.3% were negative-amortisation. Thus as well as 
initial LTV ratios being higher than before, they stayed high on an ongoing 
basis. Again, these loan types seem to have been more common in the United 
States than elsewhere: in fact, there does not seem to be any evidence that 
negative amortisation products exist at all in any of the peer group of countries 
considered  here.  As  discussed  below,  one  consequence  of  this  is  that  US 
households were more likely than those in other countries to end up in negative 
equity as housing prices started to fall.  
 
Within the subprime market, at least, some of the easing in standards in the 
dimensions of LTV ratios, documentation standards and amortisation patterns 
was at least partly compensated for by requiring that borrowers of these loans 
have higher credit (FICO) scores than average (Bhardwaj and Sengupta 2008). 
The result of this trade-off was probably to shift the overall subprime mortgage 
loan book to a state of being more resilient to idiosyncratic income shocks (as 
captured by FICO scores), but less so in the face of lower housing prices. 
Higher initial LTVs and non-amortising loans imply that borrowers would be 
more likely to end up in negative equity if housing prices fall, and thus less 
able to sell or refinance their home rather than default (Ellis 2008). Falling 
housing prices were clearly implicated in many of the early defaults on US 
mortgages  recently  (Haughwout,  Peach  and  Tracy  2008).  The  trade-off  in 
lending standards might have seemed reasonable given credit risk assessments 
using historical data that only covered periods of rising prices. Allowing for 
the risk of falling housing prices, though, this shift should be interpreted as a 
net easing even within the subprime market.  
 
2.2.1  Negative Equity Became Unusually Widespread  
Housing prices increased rapidly in the United States during the boom phase –
by around two-thirds over the period 2000–06 – but mortgage debt more than 
doubled.  The  average  gearing  on  the  housing  stock  rose  steadily,  reaching 
around 45% even before prices started to fall; this is almost double the ratio in 
Australia, for example. Since around 30% of US homeowners own their homes 
outright (Bucks et al. 2006), a sizeable minority of households must have had 
very little equity in their homes, even at the price peak.  
 
Current LTV ratios for mortgages that were not originated recently can often 
only be calculated approximately. Houses that are not currently on the market 
will not have a recent market price to refer to; appraisals might also contain 
some  estimation  error.  No  comprehensive,  official  data  sources  exist  on 
current  LTV  ratios  for  existing  borrowers.  One  private  sector  estimate 
nonetheless suggested that more than 10% of the US single-family housing 
stock (around 7% of all households) were already in negative equity in early Ellis    364 
 
 
2008. Subsequent estimates for early 2009 were as high as one in six. Cagan’s 
(2007) estimates suggest that around 5% of loans made in the boom period of 
the early 2000s were already in negative equity at the end of 2006, though the 
figure for older loans was lower. These estimates are much higher than the 
available  corresponding  figures  in  other  countries,  or  even  the  peak 
proportions reached in some other countries’ past housing busts. For example, 
in the United Kingdom, recent Bank of England estimates derived from survey 
data  imply  that  less  than  5%  of  households  with  mortgages  (and  an  even 
smaller proportion of all households) would end up in negative equity, even if 
housing prices were to fall by 20% or more (Bean 2008).  
 
The unusual prevalence of negative equity in the United States has been driven 
by several factors. Firstly, because of the pattern of frequent refinancing, the 
stock of outstanding mortgages is quite young and borrowers have had little 
time  to  pay  down  principal.  Even  with  a  normal  amortising  mortgage,  the 
principal is only paid down slowly in the first few years. Secondly, as was 
noted above, interest-only and negative amortisation loans seem to have been 
more  prevalent  in  the  United  States  than  elsewhere  in  recent  years.  Their 
popularity has meant that more households could have higher ongoing LTV 
ratios for a given starting LTV ratio. They were therefore more likely to fall 
into negative equity if house prices fell.  
 
Negative amortisation products – commonly known as Option ARMs or Pay-
Option  ARMs  –  are  particularly  prone  to  sending  borrowers  into  negative 
equity  if  prices  stabilise  or  fall.  Borrowers  of  this  type  of  mortgage  can 
nominate  a  payment  which  does  not  even  cover  the  interest.  Any  shortfall 
would be capitalised into the loan balance, up to a pre-specified limit relative 
to  the  original  loan  size.  At  that  point,  the  required  payment  would  be 
recalculated (“recast”) to be the amount needed to fully amortise the loan over 
the  remaining  term.  On  top  of  the  payment  shock  effects  of  these  recasts, 
negative amortisation products imply a greater risk of default because they can 
end up in negative equity even if housing prices do not fall. All that is required 
is that housing prices rise by less than the rate of interest capitalised during the 
negative amortisation period.  
 
Another  factor  that  could  have  driven  the  apparently  high  prevalence  of 
negative equity was that the boom-bust cycle was concentrated in a few areas. 
The incidence of negative equity depends on the number of borrowers in the 
tail of the distribution where the fall in prices exceeds the percentage of the 
home’s value representing their home equity at the point that prices peaked. A 
small price fall on average will result in more borrowers falling into negative 
equity if the distribution of price falls includes a tail of extremely large falls, 
than if the price fall is more evenly distributed. Thus the national price indices 
probably understate the percentage of households with negative equity in those 
areas. The overall incidence might therefore be greater than simulations using 
national data imply. Again, this seems to have been a particular issue for the 365    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
United States. As an indicator of this, the coefficient of variation of house 
price growth rates in the United States across states or cities more than doubled 
between 2002 and 2006. In contrast, those for Australia, Spain and Britain 
were not only somewhat smaller during the earlier parts of their booms, as 
would be expected for the less diverse regions in smaller economies: they also 
did not rise as much, if at all, as their booms progressed.
9,10 
 
2.3  Arrears Rates Deteriorated Before the Economy Did  
 
In the current US housing downturn, mortgage arrears started rising before the 
economy turned down and before credit tightened. As the right-hand panel of 
Figure 4 shows, arrears rates started to rise rapidly, well before unemployment 
did.  Even  the  arrears  rate  on  prime  mortgages  increased  by  one-quarter 
between  its  trough  in  early  2005  and  mid-2007,  despite  a  decline  in 
unemployment over this period. By the end of 2007, arrears rates were much 
higher  than  in  the  previous  recession.  All  this  occurred  well  before  credit 
standards  were  tightened.  The  tightening  in  credit,  especially  the  reduced 
availability  of  subprime  and  Alt-A  loans,  was  a  response  to  increasing 
delinquencies and defaults, not the initial impetus to them. This was exactly 
the opposite of the sequence of events in other countries over the current cycle.  
 
Arrears rates also responded unusually swiftly to the fall in housing prices. 
After drifting up fairly gently since the end of 2004, both the Federal Reserve 
and Mortgage Bankers Association measures of arrears experienced points of 
inflection in the third quarter of 2006. This was the same period that the Case-
Shiller national house price index recorded its first quarterly fall of the current 
episode; the turning point in the serious (90-plus days) delinquency rate shown 
in Figure 5 was two quarters later.  
 
These developments contrast with the pattern seen in previous housing busts. 
The Canada and United Kingdom panels of Figures 4 and 5 show how this 
played out in the early 1990s busts in the United Kingdom and Canada. In the 
United Kingdom, house prices peaked in mid-1989, and there was a slight rise 
in  arrears  rates  in  the  following  year.  But  the  large  cycle  in  delinquencies 
seems to have coincided with the unemployment rate. Likewise in Canada, 
arrears rates started rising in advance of unemployment, but the large upswing 
seemed to be just as much driven by rising unemployment as falling housing 
                                                        
9 In Canada, the coefficient of variation was lower than that in the United States for 
most of the past decade, but rose markedly from around mid-2006, as the price boom 
became skewed to the mining-dominated provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
10 The  calculations  of  the  coefficients  of  variation  of  housing  price  growth  used 
OFHEO data for the United States, Department of Communities and Local Government 
regional  data  for  the  for  the  United  Kingdom  excluding  Northern  Ireland  (via 
DataStream), Australian Bureau of Statistics house price indices (Cat. No. 6416.0) for 
Australia, Statistics Canada house price indices (via DataStream) for Canada, and the 
above-mentioned Ministerio de Vivendia data for Spain.   Ellis    366 
 
 
prices. The United States did not experience a national housing downturn in 
this  period,  but  several  regions  did.  Even  there,  it  took  a  macroeconomic 



















































Note:  Arrears rates for the United Kingdom and Canada are for loans at least 3 months 
in arrears. For the United States, rate is the “serious delinquency” rate (90+ days in 
arrears or in foreclosure). 
Sources:  Council  of  Mortgage  Lenders,  Canadian  Banker  Association,  Mortgage 
Bankers Association, National Sources via DataStream 
 
 
The rapid increase in US arrears rates, absent a macroeconomic downturn, also 
contrasts with more recent experience elsewhere. For example, both the United 
Kingdom and Australia experienced mid-cycle slowdowns and even falls in 
                                                        
11A  similar  pattern  also  seems  to  have  applied  in  the  banking  crises  in  the  Nordic 
countries  around  the  same  time,  although  without  time  series  for  arrears  rates  on 
residential mortgages, it is difficult to be precise about the timing. From the pattern of 
credit losses, however, it is clear that households were not the first or most important 
class of defaulters in the Nordic banking crises (Drees and Pazarbasiouglu 1998). 367    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
housing prices in the mid 2000s, as interest rates rose. Arrears rates increased 
somewhat  during  this  period,  but  drifted  down  again  after  several  quarters 
(RBA  2007a).  Neither  country  saw  an  increased  tendency  for  early-stage 
delinquencies  to  convert  to  serious  (90+  days)  delinquency  and  ultimate 
default,  suggesting  that  these  were  borrowers  with  temporary  payment 
difficulties. Likewise, housing prices started to fall in Ireland early in 2007, but 
according to the central bank’s end-2007 financial stability report, there was as 
yet  no  sign  of  increasing  arrears  rates.  More  recently,  arrears  rates  in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Spain  only  started  to  rise  significantly  once 
unemployment did.  
 






















































See Notes to Figure 4. 
 
 
Compared with the more recent US bust, these other episodes seem to have 
been  driven  by  a  different  mix  of  the  two  motivations  for  mortgage 
delinquency and default emphasised in the literature. The ability-to-pay model 
emphasises the affordability of the repayment, and individual income-related 
factors such as income, income variability and employment (Barth and Yezer, Ellis    368 
 
 
1983,  Deng,  Quigley,  Van  Order  and  Mac,  1996,  Diaz-Serrano,  2005). 
Households  default  on  their  mortgages  because  they  lose  their  jobs,  get 
divorced, or incur large medical bills (Bernanke 2008). Rising interest rates 
(and thus required mortgage repayments) could add to the effect. These are 
mainly  the  idiosyncratic  risks  of  individual  personal  tragedy,  although 
macroeconomic downturns would also increase delinquencies and defaults as 
unemployment rises, especially in countries with less of a social safety net. 
The high level of delinquencies and foreclosures in “rust-belt” states such as 
Ohio and Michigan should be seen in this context.  
 
A competing model, the equity model of default, treats the choice to default as 
a put option. It depicts borrowers as defaulting rationally when they are in 
negative  equity  (Jackson  and  Kaserman  1980,  Epperson,  Kau,  Keenan  and 
Muller 1985, Foster and Van Order 1985). The concerns about “walkaways” 
are based on an assumption that this model describes household behaviour, or 
may increasingly come to do so.  
 
The  full  story  is  probably  a  more  nuanced  combination  of  these  factors. 
Empirical research has generally found that borrowers default far less often 
than the pure option-theoretic model would predict (Vandell and Thibodeau 
1985,  Vandell  1995,  Foote,  Gerardi  and  Willen  2008b).  Some  research 
emphasizes the role of trigger events – including changes in the ability to pay – 
in determining the timing of borrowers’ decisions on whether to default (Kau 
and Keenan 1995, Duygan and Grant 2006).  
 
Even if households only default after experiencing a negative income shock, 
arrears rates and defaults should still be expected to increase as housing prices 
fall. As housing prices rise, individual borrowers in financial difficulty can sell 
their homes and clear their debt without defaulting; for example, arrears rates 
rose in the New England region during the 2001 US recession, but foreclosures 
did not, because prices were rising (Foote et al. 2008a). If housing prices are 
falling, however, borrowers’ equity cushions diminish.  
 
They are then more likely to spend some time in arrears after an income shock, 
because  they  cannot  resolve  the  situation  by  selling  quickly.  Arrears  and 
default  rates  can  therefore  start  to  rise  even  when  unemployment  is  low, 
without borrowers seeing this as “walking away”.  
 
To disentangle the relative importance of ability-to-pay variables and housing 
prices, Table 1 presents the results from simple regression models of aggregate 
mortgage  arrears  rates,  for  Canada,  Spain  and  the  United  States.
12 ,  13By 
                                                        
12The semi-annual frequency of UK arrears data prevented its inclusion. Alternative 
specifications including the level or change in mortgage interest rates were not more 
successful  than  the  ones  presented  in  the  table.  Coefficients  on  interest  rates  were 
generally insignificant. In the US results the few significant coefficients were negative, 
which suggests that it is not picking up the intended effect of the payment shock of 369    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
focusing on arrears rates, the emphasis is on possible differences in borrower 
behavior, rather than that of lenders. Foreclosures are a joint outcome of the 
borrowers’ defaults and the lenders’ decisions to enforce their claim on the 
collateral, which is in turn affected by the legal system (see Section 3.3 below). 
Given  the  increased  US  market  share  of  subprime  lenders  with  collateral-
oriented business models, it would not be surprising if foreclosures increased 
relative to arrears rates.
14 
 
For  Canada  and  Spain,  the  results  are  as  expected:  arrears  rates  rise  when 
housing prices fall (negative coefficient on housing price growth) and when 
unemployment is higher. In Spain, the change in the unemployment rate seems 
to be at least as important as the level; the recent increase in unemployment is 
more than sufficient to explain the increase in arrears since mid 2007. Falls in 
housing prices alone were not significant in the regression for Spain, while in 
Canada, it seems that increases in housing prices reduced arrears rates more 
than price falls raised them. Canada experienced a period of falling housing 
prices in the early 1990s (Figure 5), so if a special role for price falls was to be 
found in past data, it would be here. 
 
The results for the United States using the OFHEO measure of house prices are 
also broadly consistent with the predictions from theory. There is a (short-
lived) negative effect from housing price growth, while higher unemployment 
raises arrears rates. All of these coefficients are highly significant, although the 
fit  is  poor,  and  the  model  completely  fails  to  capture  the  recent  run-up  in 
arrears. There was no special role for housing price falls, though this is most 
likely  because  so  few  falls  have  been  recorded  in  this  series,  even  on  a 
quarterly basis, prior to the current bust.  
 
                                                                                                                          
higher  interest  rates  leading  to  higher  arrears  rates.  Including  interest  rates  as  an 
explanator did not materially  affect the coefficients on other variables. The interest 
rates  used  in  these  alternative  econometric  specifications  were  typical  mortgage  or 
retail lending rates collected by central banks or other authorities and either republished 
by DataStream or compiled by the BIS. For Canada, these were the 1-year and 5-year 
mortgage rates charged by chartered banks; for Spain, the prime lending rate. For the 
United States, the 30-year fixed conforming mortgage rate published by the Federal 
Reserve was used for the OFHEO regression, while the average effective mortgage rate 
published  by  the  Federal  Housing  Finance  Board  was  used  for  the  Case-  Shiller 
regressions. This difference reflected the longer time series available for conforming 
mortgage rates, and that they are a better match to the population of transactions used in 
the compilation of the OFHEO index. These results are available from the author. 
13 The value of doubtful housing loans in Spain is published by the Banco d’España on 
their  web  site  at  http://www.bde.es/infoest/sindie.htm.  Note  that  this  definition  is 
somewhat broader than the arrears rates shown for other countries, as it can include 
loans where repayment is considered doubtful even if not currently in arrears. The same 
series is used in the econometrics reported in Table 1. 
14 Non-bank  and  non-conforming  lenders  also  seem  increasingly  keen  to  seek 
repossession in Australia and the United Kingdom of late (RBA 2007a). Ellis    370 
 
 
Table 1  Results of Various Regression Models of Mortgage Arrears 
Rates 
















HP Growth  –0.016  –0.074  –0.065  –  – 
HP Growth 
(Lagged) 
–0.017  –  0.068  0.021  0.017 
HP Falls  0.011  –  –  0.028†  –0.227 
HP Falls 
(Lagged) 
0.005  –  –  –  – 
Unemployment  –  0.721  –  0.419  0.351 
Unemployment 
(Lagged) 
0.008  –0.509  0.155  –0.397  –0.410 
Constant  0.442  –0.005†  0.038  0.043  0.048 
R-bar-squared  0.901  0.886  0.201  0.749  0.725 
Durbin-Watson  0.100  0.208  0.227  1.151  1.101 
Note: Housing price growth calculated as year-ended percentage changes; house prices 
falls are the (negative) quarterly percentage change in prices when a fall occurred, and 
zero otherwise. In both cases, “lagged” refers to growth over the year (quarter for falls) 
ending one year previously. For unemployment, “lagged” refers to the unemployment 
rate one year previously, except for Canada (nine months previously). All coefficients 
are significant at the 1% level at worst, using Newey-West adjusted standard errors, 
except where marked with a dagger (†, not significant even at the 10% level). 
Sources: Canadian Bankers’ Association, Banco de España, DataStream. 
 
 
Using the Case-Shiller data over a necessarily shorter time period provides a 
stark contrast to the results for the other countries. The main point can be seen 
by contrasting the fourth column, where the data sample for the United States 
ends in 2004, with the fifth, where the whole sample up to the first quarter of 
2008 is used. Prior to 2004, the change in the unemployment rate was the 
strongest predictor of arrears rates, as implied by the ability-to-pay view of 
mortgage delinquency. Housing price falls had no statistically significant role 
in the regression, and the coefficient on house price growth was significant and 
positive.  
 
Adding in the last four years of data results is a completely different story. The 
role of unemployment diminishes, and the coefficient on housing prices also 
falls marginally. The coefficient on housing price falls jumps up substantially, 
however, and becomes highly significant. While this equation’s in-sample fit is 
good,  and  it  manages  to  capture  the  upswing  in  the  arrears  rate,  this  only 




15 Out-of-sample forecasts from the model estimated up to 2004 would 
not have predicted any increase in arrears rates at all, even when the sharp fall 
in housing prices was allowed for.  
 
Controlling  for some  measure of ex ante credit quality (e.g. average initial 
LTV or share of low-doc loans) might have helped disentangle whether this 
change in the reduced-form relationship between arrears and housing prices 
could be attributed to observable credit quality. Were such a variable available, 
a  positive  coefficient  (or  a  negative  one  on  that  variable  interacted  with 
housing price falls) would be evidence in favour of the contention that the 
easing in US mortgage lending standards contributed to the rise in arrears rates 
seen in the current episode. No such aggregate time series variable exists for 
the United States or any other country, however, and any series constructed 
from securitisation data (e.g. the LoanPerformance data in Figure 3) will not 
go back far enough.  
 
These aggregate regressions might be crude, but they still tell a similar story to 
the  recent  work  using  loan-level  data.  Demyanyk  and  Van  Hemert  (2007) 
found  that  arrears  rates  and  defaults  were  much  higher  for  subprime  loans 
originated in recent years than would have been predicted from their borrower 
and loan characteristics and the behaviour of subprime loans originated earlier 
in the decade. Credit quality declined progressively through the decade in all 
categories of subprime loan. The deterioration only became obvious, however, 
once housing price growth slowed and borrowers could no longer refinance or 
sell their way out of trouble.  
 
As well as overall arrears rates rising rapidly once housing prices began to fall, 
the proportion of loans in serious delinquency – at least 90 days in arrears or in 
foreclosure  –  rose  even  faster,  accounting  for  a  much  larger  share  of  total 
delinquencies  than  usual.  This  is  another  data  point  suggesting  that  US 
households have become unusually sensitive to housing price falls, relative to 
households in other countries, and perhaps to past US experience. If the rise in 
delinquencies were instead mainly driven by worse income shocks, a larger 
fraction of borrowers in short-term arrears would be expected to self-cure and 
get  back  on  schedule.  Now  that  the  US  labour  market  has  weakened 
significantly, arrears rates will probably rise further. In many respects, though, 
this would be a less surprising phenomenon, much more in keeping with past 
behaviour and with outcomes in other countries.  
 
2.3.1  An Aside: It Was Not Just Subprime 
As the history books are written, the current financial crisis will inevitably be 
labeled  the  “subprime  crisis”.  Yet  to  focus  on  the  subprime  sector  to  the 
                                                        
15Another way of showing this changing behaviour is that in the period 1989–2000, 
arrears rates and Case-Shiller house price growth did not Granger-cause one another, 
but over 1999–2008, both did. Ellis    372 
 
 
exclusion of all others is in many ways to misdiagnose the problem. Part of the 
confusion lies with the definition of subprime (Mayer and Pence 2008). In 
much  of  the  media  commentary,  the  description  has  been  applied  to  the 
borrower, signifying a low-income borrower, or one with an impaired credit 
record. At other times, it is used to describe loans with risky features such as 
limited  documentation.  Studies  of  securitisation  data  (Ashcraft  and 
Schuermann 2008, for example) labels loans as subprime if the issuer labeled 
the  MBS  as  such.  Other  empirical  analysis  (Dell’Ariccia,  Igan  and  Laeven 
2008, Foote et al. 2008a, for example)  uses the definition provided by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): subprime mortgages 
are those originated by subprime lenders, defined in turn as lenders meeting 
criteria unrelated to their customers’ FICO scores, though these are definitely 
correlated. This might help explain why so many “subprime” borrowers were 
previously and subsequently able to qualify for a “prime” loan (Brooks and 
Simon 2007). Many properties purchased with prime loans were subsequently 
refinanced with a subprime loan, and only then went into foreclosure (Foote et 
al. 2008a).  
 
The  absolute  level  and  increase  in  arrears  rates  were  clearly  greater  in  the 
subprime segment, however defined. That subprime loans experienced such 
high rates of arrears and foreclosures was already apparent in much earlier 
cohorts. For example, around 12% of subprime refinance loans originated in 
the late 1990s ended in the loss of the home within five years (Quercia et al. 
2007).
16 The surprise element of the recent increase in arrears does seem to 
have been higher in the subprime segment; this might help explain why the 
initial propagation to MBS and related structured finance was concentrated in 
subprime loans, along with the details of the credit structuring emphasised by 
Gorton (2008). But as Figure 6 shows, the turning point in arrears rates was 
quite similar for prime (including some Alt-A) and subprime loans.  
 
The generality of the increase in arrears rates also applies across securitised 
loans  and  those  that  remained  on  the  balance  sheet,  which  saw  almost 
simultaneous increases (Figure 7, left-hand panel). Even if it was the strong 
investor demand for asset-backed paper that encouraged lenders to ease credit 
standards, it seems to have affected their entire lending business, not just the 
securitised portion. 
 
The  real  distinction  is  between  loans  that  were  in  the  FHA  pool  or  the 
conforming market – those insurable by the GSEs – and those that were not in 
either of those groups. Although there was some easing of standards in the 
conforming market, especially in the GSEs’ extended programs and the FHA 
seller-financed downpayment program, it was minor compared with the one 
                                                        
16 Tables 1 and 3 in Quercia et al. (2007) show that 20% of subprime refinance loans 
originated in 1998 or 1999 went into foreclosure at least once by the end of 2003. Of 
these, around 60% ended in loss of the home. 373    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
that occurred in the rest of  the  market.  Arrears rates on  the GSEs’ single-
family home portfolio have risen a great deal recently, but this only started in 
the second half of 2007 (Figure 7, right-hand panel). Likewise, the increase in 
arrears rates on FHA mortgages has been fairly mild.  
 
 


























Note: Shows all loans at least 30 days delinquent or in foreclosure.  
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association via DataStream. 
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Sources:  Fannie  Mae,  Freddie  Mac,  Federal  Reserve  and  Mortgage  Bankers 
Association via DataStream. 
 
 
This is not to say that the subprime and non-Agency prime markets behaved 
identically  or  that  the  easing  in  lending  standards  was  the  same  in  both 
segments. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) show clear differences in the behaviour of 
denial rates on mortgage applications between the two lender types. Subprime 
lenders  reduced  denial  rates  in  the  face  of  larger  application  volumes  and 
increased  local  competition  from  large  national  lenders.  In  contrast,  prime 
lenders  were  little  affected  by  new  entrant  lenders  and  tended  to  increase 
denial  rates  as  applications  increased.  Despite  these  differences,  however, Ellis    374 
 
 
arrears rates began to rise around the same time in both markets. This suggests 
that other aspects of easing lending standards were also important contributors 
to the subsequent increases in arrears rates.  
 
Other countries have subprime lending in some form; for many others, there is 
no law preventing it from developing. So a complete answer to the question of 
why  the  mortgage  meltdown  and  credit  losses  were  a  US-specific  problem 
cannot stop at the point of noting that the United States ended up with more 
subprime lending. It is also important to ask why that occurred, and why US 
subprime lending seemed to have involved loan features that boosted arrears 
rates, independent of the outward creditworthiness of borrowers. In contrast to 
the US experience, initial LTV ratios remained low in the UK adverse credit 
mortgage sector, the closest equivalent to the US subprime sector (Bank of 
England 2007), and arrears have not ratcheted upwards in the same way.  
 
Crews Cutts and Van Order (2004) survey the US subprime market in the early 
phases  of  its  expansion.  They  emphasise  the  discontinuities  inherent  in  a 
mortgage market segmented between prime and specialist subprime lenders, 
and suggest that this market structure might have been the result of lender 
attempts to get borrowers to reveal asymmetric information about themselves 
(a separating equilibrium). One corollary of this is that borrowers have private 
information  about  their  quality  that  FICO  scores  do  not  capture.  More 
importantly  for  subsequent  outcomes,  it  implies  that  the  reduction  in 
conforming origination activity from 2004 (see Figure 3) brought to the fore 
lenders with very different business models from those of prime lenders. In 
particular,  the  separating  equilibrium  implies  that  subprime  lenders  do  less 
underwriting than prime lenders, even though their customers are riskier.  
 
 
3.  Understanding the Institutional Drivers of the Differences  
 
3.1  Supply of New Housing Is Relatively Flexible  
 
An important institutional difference between the United States and some of 
the other countries discussed here relates to the build-up of housing oversupply 
documented  in  Section  2.1.  Essentially,  the  elasticity  of  housing  supply  is 
higher in the United States than in countries such as the United Kingdom, and 
the long-term response is less drawn out than in Australia (Berger-Thomson 
and Ellis 2004). With a larger quantity response, housing prices rise by less in 
the face of a given increase in demand for housing. Normally, this flexibility is 
held to be a good thing because it limits the price overvaluation that can occur 
when demands for housing increases quickly, given inherently sluggish supply. 
When the increase in demand is temporary, however, for example driven by a 
temporary  easing  in  credit  standards,  it  is  not  so  obvious  that  this  supply 
flexibility is unreservedly beneficial. 
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One underlying reason of the higher US supply elasticity is that less of the 
housing stock is subject to tight zoning laws and other restrictions that might 
restrict supply and boost housing prices (Glaeser and Gyourko 2003a, Glaeser 
and Gyourko 2003b). While such restrictions are important in a number of 
high-cost, mainly coastal centres in the United States, in many inland regions, 
new supply are relatively unrestricted. Regions with tighter zoning restrictions 
also tend to be the ones where geographical constraints on building (oceans, 
steeply sloped areas) are greatest (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz 2008), so the 
pattern of supply elasticities would probably exist even without zoning laws.  
 
In the most recent US housing boom, the increased demand for housing did 
seem unusually concentrated in regions where supply could accommodate it 
most rapidly, namely as single-family homes built in exurban regions such as 
southern California’s Inland Empire, or the regions around desert state cities 
such as Phoenix (Arizona) and Las Vegas (Nevada). Indeed, in contrast to the 
1980s boom (Glaeser et al. 2008), recent evidence suggests that the “bubble” 
component  of  US  housing  prices  was  greatest  in  some  cities,  such  as  Las 
Vegas,  where  the  elasticity  of  housing  supply  is  higher  than  the  national 
average (Goodman and Thibodeau 2008). Other centres such as Atlanta had 
relatively  small  price  booms,  because  supply  could  respond,  but  have  not 
thereby  avoided  the  subsequent  bust.  By  contrast,  in  high-demand  coastal 
cities,  prices  rose  but  there  was  little  pick-up  in  housing  supply  and, 
significantly,  subprime  and  other  non-conforming  lending  was  much  less 
prevalent (Mayer and Pence 2008).  
 
Figure 8 (left-hand panel) shows how unusual the recent US housing supply 
cycle  was relative to those of the past. In past upswings, the single-family 
share of housing starts remained fairly steady. It only ratcheted up during the 
subsequent  downswing  in  overall  activity,  as  condominium  projects  were 
canceled  disproportionately.  Over  the  period  2000–2006,  however,  both 
housing starts and the single-family share  within them rose, pointing to an 
unusual concentration of the increase in suburban and exurban regions.  
 
Data limitations, especially on city-level construction costs, preclude a cross-
country  comparison  of  city-level  supply  elasticities  along  the  lines  of 
Goodman and Thibodeau’s (2008) results for the United States. Nonetheless, 
the right-hand panel of Figure 8 provides some suggestive evidence that the 
apparently regional booms reflected US households moving where the houses 
were, rather than being motivated by more traditional labour market incentives. 
The first three cities/regions in that panel show the patterns that emerge when a 
particular city or region experiences a regionally specific demand shock that 
encourages  inward  migration.  In  the  case  of  Perth  (Australia)  and  Alberta 
province (Canada), the shock is the current mining boom (2003–end-2007). 
For San Francisco in the 1990s, the shock was the tech boom (1997–end-2000). 
In  each  of  these  cases,  housing  prices  rose  more  rapidly  than  the  national 
average: the cumulated growth over the boom period was more than double Ellis    376 
 
 
that  of  the  nation  as  a  whole.  Employment  and  population  growth  also 
exceeded the national figures. But the source of the inward pull is also clear: 
even though the ratios of national employment to total population increased by 
around  2  percentage  points  over  these  periods,  the  employment-population 
ratios in Perth, Alberta and San Francisco increased even more. 
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Note:  Figures  for  Perth  (Australia)  and  Alberta  (Canada)  are  for  January  2003  –
December 2007; for San Francisco, January 1997–December 2000; for Phoenix, Las 
Vegas and Tampa, January 2002–December 2006. Employment growth and change in 
employment to population ratio for Las Vegas refer to Nevada State.  
(1)  Ratio  of  percentage  change  in  house  prices  /  employment  over  period,  to 
corresponding percentage change for the whole nation.  
(2) Difference between change in employment-population ratio for the city/region and 
that for the whole nation, in percentage points. Population figures are whole population, 
not working-age population. 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, National Sources via DataStream  
 
 
By contrast in the three cities on the right of the panel – Phoenix, Las Vegas 
and Tampa, Florida – housing prices also rose at around double the national 
rate over the period 2002–2006, despite a substantial increment to the housing 
stock over the same period. All three cities were attracting substantial inward 
migration: employment increased by around 20 per cent in Phoenix and nearly 
one-quarter  in  Las  Vegas,  compared  with  the  5  per  cent  increase  in 
employment at the national level. However, the employment-population ratio 
increased  by  only  1.2  percentage  points  in  Las  Vegas,  and  actually  fell  in 
Phoenix and Tampa (the national ratio was broadly flat over this period). New 
homes were being built to house the new residents, but the picture seems to be 
that these new households were going to where the new, higher-quality homes 
were, rather than being pulled to a region of high job opportunities, perhaps 
because  many  of  them  were  already  retired.  This  was  probably  further 
encouraged by the apparently high geographic mobility of the US population.  
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No wonder that the housing price boom was initially characterised as being 
regional  in  nature  (Greenspan  2005,  for  example).  With  hindsight,  a  better 
characterisation  might  have  been  of  strong  demand  for  housing  nationally, 
stimulated  by  easier  credit  that  manifested  itself  where  supply  could 
accommodate it the most. By concentrating the increases in both demand and 
supply geographically, the US institutional and geographical structures seem to 
have maximised the potential for build-up of excess supply in at least some 
regions. Now that the boost to demand from easier credit has been withdrawn 
and  homes  a  long  distance  from  employment  centres  have  become  less 
attractive  as  gasoline  prices  rise,  it  seems  hard  to  imagine  that  this  supply 
overhang will be worked off quickly, without a substantial fall in prices in 
these regions.  
 
3.2  Tax System Encourages Higher Leverage and Flipping  
 
In  the  United  States,  interest  on  mortgages  for  owner-occupied  homes  is 
deductible against income tax. The imputed rent from owning one’s home and 
not paying rent to a landlord is likewise free of tax. Both of these aspects of the 
tax  system  encourage  households  to  buy  their  own  home.  The  US  system 
differs from many others in that it has both features (see Table 2): only Spain 
comes  close,  and  the  tax  credits  there  do  not  apply  to  all  borrowers.
17 
Numerous countries – including most other English-speaking countries – do 
not tax imputed rent, but do not allow interest on owner-occupied mortgages to 
be deducted. In countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, mortgage 
interest  can  be  deducted  against  tax,  but  households  also  pay  tax  on  the 
estimated imputed rent or the value of the home. In either case, the implicit 
subsidy to homeownership through the tax system is less than in the United 
States, though by how much depends on the relative tax rates and the way that 
imputed rents are calculated.  
 
Encouraging  home  ownership  has  long  been  an  explicit  policy  goal  in  the 
United States, so these differences in taxation arrangements are not surprising. 
One effect of them, though, is that US households have less incentive to pay 
off an owner-occupied mortgage quickly. Because they are paying it out of pre-
tax, not post-tax, income, they are more likely to find it worthwhile to borrow 
against their homes and accumulate more non-housing assets. In addition, the 
value of prepaying a mortgage ahead of schedule is lower than if the interest is 
non-deductible. US households therefore have more incentive to keep the LTV 
ratio high on an ongoing basis. This might explain some of the differences 
described in the previous sections, namely a greater prevalence of interest-only 
mortgages and the rapid increase in cases of negative equity. Mortgage interest 
was  also  tax-deductible  in  the  Nordic  countries  at  the  time  of  their  credit 
booms in the 1980s; this has previously been cited as one of the contributing 
                                                        
17 Although not all US taxpayers itemise deductions (Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 
2005), it seems reasonable to suppose that the marginal borrower does. Ellis    378 
 
 




Table 2  Taxation Arrangements Affecting Housing and Mortgages in 
Selected Countries 















US  Yes  Yes
3  Partly
4  Yes  Full  No
5 
UK  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Full  No 
Australia  No  Yes  Limited
6  Yes  Part  Yes 
Canada  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Part  Yes
7 
France  No  Yes
8  Limited  Yes  Part
8  Part 
Germany  No  Yes
8  Limited  Yes  Part
8  Yes 
Ireland  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Part  No 
Neth.  Yes  Yes  No  No  None  No 
NZ  No  Yes  Limited
6  Yes  None  Yes 
Spain  Partial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Full
9  From 2007
10 
Sweden  Yes  No  No  No  Part  Yes 
Switz.  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Note: The first four columns and the last column of the table are specified so that a “Yes” 
entry indicates a more favourable tax treatment than a “No” or “Partly/Limited” entry.  
1. “Part” implies concessional rate compared with marginal tax rate applying to labour 
income. 
2. Refers to ability to deduct mortgage interest and other costs accruing to landlords 
from labour as well as rental income. 
3. In most cases, capital gains can be carried over.  
4. Local property taxes.   
5. Only professional property investors can write off against other income.   
6. Local rates loosely linked to property values.   
7. Cash costs only.   
8. Exemption subject to a long holding period.   
9. on inflation-adjusted gains.  
10. Negative gearing first allowed in Spain in 2007 
*Taxation arrangements for buy-to-let property in Ireland are discussed in the “Rental 
income”  brochure  available  on  the  website  of  the  Revenue  Commissioners 
(http://www.revenue.ie/index.htm?/leaflets/it70.htm  ).  For  Spain,  the  information  is 
available (in Spanish) from the website of the Agencia Tributaria (http://www.aeat.es/). 
The rest of the table was combined from the secondary sources cited. 
Sources: Haffner and Dol (2000), van den Noord and Heady (2001), RBA (2003d), 
Scanlon and Whitehead (2004), Committee on the Global Financial System  (2006), Ellis 
(2006), Irish Revenue Commissioners, Agencia Tributaria d’España (Spanish Tax Office). 
 
 
These tax differences interact with the greater tendency to refinance described 
below in Section 3.6. When mortgage interest is paid out of pre-tax income, the 
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interest is not deductible. As the boom wore on, it seems that many households 
were repeatedly refinancing to liquefy the increasing value of their homes. 
Even some long-standing home owners were left with little equity cushion. 
 
Another possible consequence of these tax arrangements is that speculative 
demand is relatively more likely to manifest as “flipping” (buying and selling 
soon afterwards), rather than renting the property out to a tenant. In contrast, in 
countries  where  mortgage  interest  is  deductible  against  rental  (and  maybe 
other) income for a buy-to-let property, but not for an owner-occupied property 
or second home, it is preferable to actually let the property out. An inability to 
rent the property out will therefore provide a natural brake on the incentive to 
speculate in property, even if expected capital gains are still strong. By contrast, 
where speculation in property occurs through flipping, an overhang of excess 
housing can build up before lower sale prices signal this fact to investors. This 
could take some time in the housing market, given time-to-build lags and the 
noisy price signals provided by heterogeneous individual properties.  
 
This is not to say that speculative demand from buy-to-let investors has played 
no role in housing price booms elsewhere. Small property investors have been 
identified as an important driver of demand in the booms in Australia (RBA 
2003d) and the United Kingdom. Even so, because landlords in these countries 
have to make the property available for rent to claim the tax deduction, they 
received earlier signals about excess supply by being unable to find a tenant or 
by observing falling rents. Flippers, by contrast, will only learn that excess 
housing supply is building up once they or other investors start trying to sell 
the properties again, and prices start falling; this is especially true if they are 
concentrated in newly built districts with few comparable sales early on.  
 
Since holding periods (even for “flippers”) are likely to be longer than the lag 
between purchase and noticing difficulties in tenanting, US investors were able 
to create a larger overhang of rental properties, as well as properties intended 
for the homeowner market, before the price signals started to work through. 
Thus although there might have been some mismatches between demand and 
supply in some segments of the markets there (for example in inner-city rental 
apartments), the buy-to-let booms in Australia and the United Kingdom did not 
lead to an overall supply overhang as seen in the United States (see Section 2.1). 
 
Even apparently small details of the tax system can influence outcomes in the 
mortgage market and hence credit quality. Avery et al. (2007) point out that 
one reason for the popularity of piggyback second-mortgages in the United 
States might be that interest payments on these mortgages are separately tax-
deductible, while borrower payments for lenders’ mortgage insurance were not, 
until  recently.  Borrowers  who  could  only  make  a  small  downpayment, 
especially those in higher tax brackets, would therefore prefer to take out a 
piggyback loan than mortgage insurance for the whole amount, even if the cost Ellis    380 
 
 
of the higher interest rate on the piggyback was the same as the insurance 
premium.  
 
3.3  Legal System is Swift but Generous to Defaulters  
 
Households’ decisions to default on their mortgage, and the financial sacrifices 
they are willing to make to stay current, are clearly related to the sanctions 
they face on default. In a pan-European comparison, Duygan and Grant (2006) 
find  that  the  propensity  to  fall  into  arrears  or  to  default  in  the  face  of  an 
adverse income shock is closely related to the punishment incurred by doing so, 
which in turn depends on the legal framework.  
 
The United States has long had a reputation for having a relatively generous 
bankruptcy  system  (a  federal  matter),  though  this  was  tightened  in  2005. 
Indeed, under the law prevailing when arrears began to rise, mortgage debt 
could not be reduced as part of a bankruptcy agreement. Foreclosure law varies 
across states (Crews Cutts and Green 2004). It is often assumed that home 
mortgages  are  non-recourse  in  the  United  States  –  in  other  words,  if  the 
borrower defaults, the lender gets the home as collateral, but cannot pursue the 
borrower for any deficiency between the home’s value and the remaining debt. 
In fact, deficiency judgements are possible in 44 of the 50 states, and in at least 
one of the six with non-recourse mortgages (California), this only applies to 
purchase mortgages and not refinancing. On paper, the US system therefore 
resembles those in countries such as the United Kingdom, where borrowers 
retain personal liability for the debt.  
 
In practice, however, lenders tended not to seek deficiency judgements because 
they were seen as costly relative to the value that might be recouped. Around 
half of all US states (and of the states that prohibit deficiency judgements, all 
bar South Dakota) have a non-judicial foreclosure process – generally quicker 
and cheaper than systems where court action is required. Many lenders would 
take the view that it would be better to retrieve the collateral alone in a lower-
cost process, than to incur the legal costs of pursuing defaulting borrowers for 
any deficiency.  
 
The  US  foreclosure  process  is  also  somewhat  swifter  than  in  some  other 
countries. According to the data compiled by Crews Cutts and Green (2004), 
foreclosure proceedings can start in three months or less in half of all US states, 
and the delay exceeds six months only in Illinois and Vermont. The limited 
data  available  suggest  that  lenders  in  other  countries  must  wait  longer  on 
average to start and to complete foreclosures and repossessions (Committee on 
the Global Financial System 2006). Delinquency data for the United Kingdom 
show that some lenders will still hold mortgages that have been delinquent for 
over a year.  
 
The legal and mortgage systems in the United States have therefore interacted 
to  produce  a  different  tradeoff  between  speed  and  full  asset  recovery  than 381    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
elsewhere.  As  a  result,  when  house  prices  are  rising,  many  US  lenders’ 
incentives  are  tilted  more  strongly  in  favour  of  lending  on  the  basis  of 
collateral rather than affordability, than those of lenders elsewhere. If it turns 
out that the borrower cannot afford to repay the loan, the lender can access the 
collateral relatively quickly in at least half of all US states. Taking this together 
with differences in consumer protection regulation of mortgage lending itself, 
as described below in Section 3.5, it is no surprise that a lending sector with a 
collateral-based  business  model  developed  in  the  United  States,  and  not  in 
countries like the United Kingdom.  
 
3.4  Lenders Could Rely on External Credit Scores 
 
Another important difference between the US legal system and those of some 
other countries that experienced housing booms in recent years is that positive 
credit reporting is permitted  and privacy laws allow  this  information to be 
widely  shared.  Credit  reporting  agencies  can  collect  the  entire  history  of  a 
household’s credit events and build up a comprehensive credit score such as 
the FICO score. By contrast in Australia, the Privacy Act permits only so-
called  negative  credit  reporting,  of  events  such  as  missed  payments  and 
bankruptcy. This limits the amount of third-party information lenders can use 
in developing a widely available credit score. As a result, a US-style system, 
where a small number of scoring systems dominate across a range of different 
lending markets, has not emerged. Comprehensive credit reporting is possible 
in the United Kingdom, but lenders seem to construct their own credit scores 
rather than share them.
18 MBS investors cannot then use a third-party score as 
a substitute for their own analysis.  
 
While  credit  scoring  clearly  reduces  costs  and  increases  transparency  in 
mortgage  origination  (Committee  on  the  Global  Financial  System  2006),  it 
holds a number of potential dangers. Firstly, analogously to credit ratings for 
structured credits, households’ credit scores can be used for purposes for which 
they were not designed. The FICO score was designed to assess risks on credit 
cards and other short-term consumer credit, but was also used for mortgage 
lending. The short-term nature of the FICO score is especially apparent in the 
lower ranges mainly served by subprime lenders. Crews Cutts and Van Order 
(2004) present data from the late 1990s showing that 30% of people with sub-





                                                        
18 The information on credit scoring practices in Australia and the United Kingdom is 
sourced  from,  among  other  places,  the  websites  of  the  Australian  Privacy 
Commissioner (http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/credit/index.html) and the UK Financial 
Services Authority  
(http://www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/products/loans/credit/credit_reference_agenci
es.html). Ellis    382 
 
 
3.5  Financial Regulation Did Not Prevent Riskier Lending 
 
If lenders faced tight regulation that enforced prudent lending, the inherent 
tendency to higher LTV ratios driven by the US tax system, as described above, 
might not have actually shown up in actual lending practices. US households 
would  then  not  have  ended  up  in  negative  equity  in  such  numbers.  More 
generally, how lenders are regulated has obvious implications for the riskiness 
of mortgages offered and the propensity of borrowers to default.  
 
The US mortgage market is subject to an array of laws and different regulators. 
The regulated GSEs enforced quality control in the conforming market, but the 
rest of the mortgage market was more lightly regulated. Mortgage lenders that 
were not also depositories were the lightest regulated of all. As one example of 
the  relatively  light  regulation  of  many  mortgage  lenders,  consider  the  new 
regulations  announced  by  the  Federal  Reserve  in  December  2007  and 
approved in July 2008, as part of its role of enforcer of the Home Ownership 
and  Equity  Protection  Act.  Among  the  practices  newly  banned  by  these 
regulations were “coercing a real estate appraiser to misstate a home’s value” 
and “making a loan without regard to borrowers’ ability to repay the loan from 
income and assets other than the home’s value” (Federal Reserve Board 2008). 
The implication is that these practices were permitted in the absence of the 
new regulation, and were common enough to merit an explicit ban. Had all US 
mortgage originators been bound by a requirement to consider the affordability 
of  the  repayment  explicitly  –  as  is  the  case  under  Australia’s  Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code or the requirements of UK legislation,
19 for example – 
it  seems  unlikely  that  no-documentation  (stated-income)  mortgages  or 
“exploding ARMs” would have become so prevalent. 
 
In addition, following intervention in 2004 by the Office of the Comptroller of 
the  Currency  (OCC),  federally  regulated  lenders  were  exempted  from  state 
legislation which was in many cases stricter than that at the federal level. Some 
of  the  practices  banned  under  some  states’  law  included  the  prepayment 
penalties and balloon payments that have been shown to raise default rates, 
independent of the borrower’s credit score (Quercia et al. 2007). 
 
3.6  Cash-out Refinancing is Inexpensive in the United States  
 
The mortgage market in the United States has several unusual features that are 
seen in few other countries. As described in Green and Wachter (2005) and 
elsewhere, the US mortgage system evolved to receive indirect government 
                                                        
19 Information  on  Australia’s  Uniform  Consumer  Credit  Code  can  be  found  at 
http://www.creditcode.gov.au/. Enforcing fairness in UK mortgage lending is part of 
the remit of the Financial Services Authority, under the terms of the Unfair Terms in 
(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1999/19992083.htm)  Consumer  Contracts  Regulations 
1999, as amended in 2001(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2001/20011186.htm).For more 
information see http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/Regulated/consumer/index.shtml. 383    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
support via the GSEs. The GSEs were long able to fund themselves in capital 
markets  at  advantageous  rates.  They  insure  mortgages  with  standardised 
features and risk characteristics. A particular feature of the US system is that it 
allows long-term fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) to be refinanced at low cost. 
This means that US households can take advantage of falls in long-term rates 
while being protected from increases, something that is only possible in the 
United States and Denmark (Frankel, Gyntelberg, Kjeldsen and Persson 2004). 
Housing market outcomes differ materially when mortgages are predominantly 
at  fixed  rates  rather  than  variable  rates  (Tsatsaronis  and  Zhu  2004).  In 
particular, house prices respond less to monetary policy, and more to shocks to 
private-sector  credit,  such  as  an  easing  in  credit  standards.  This  has  clear 
implications for the US economy’s sensitivity to lending booms.  
 
Fixed-rate mortgages have to be explicitly refinanced to obtain a lower rate. 
US  prime  borrowers  in  particular  will  refinance  aggressively  when  current 
fixed mortgage rates fall far enough below the rates they are currently paying. 
Once rates start to rise again, most borrowers will only refinance if they wish 
to take cash out (Figure 9, left-hand panel). The US mortgage system therefore 
seems  to  have  evolved  to  be  set  up  for  a  higher  ratio  of  origination  to 
outstanding, than systems where loans are mostly ARMs, or where refinancing 
of fixed rate loans is either expensive or not permitted. Origination capacity 
increased even more relative to market size during the refinancing wave of 
2003  (See  Section  2.2).It  cannot  be  ruled  out  that  brokers  and  lenders 
subsequently  sought  to  keep  volumes  up  by  pursuing  ever  more  marginal 
borrowers, rather than scaling their operations back again.  
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The shift towards ARMs with initial teaser interest rates should perhaps be 
seen in this context as well. As documented in Foote et al. (2008a), teaser rates 
on many subprime mortgages were not that low, and most borrowers of these Ellis    384 
 
 
loans  refinanced  before  or  soon  after  their  rate  reset.  Both  lenders  and 
borrowers seemed to understand that this was the intention. Rather than being 
a means of reaping a higher post-reset payment from borrowers, teaser rates 
seem  to  have  been  a  device  to  maintain  origination  volumes  through 
refinancing.  On  top  of  the  incentives  provided  by  origination  fee  income, 
Gorton  (2008)  points  out  that  subprime  mortgages  were  designed  to  force 
frequent refinancing, because this limited the horizon of lenders’ exposures to 
these  borrowers.  The  combination  of  teaser  rates  and  prepayment  penalties 
thus effectively shifted the option to default from the borrower to the lender 
(by choosing not to refinance).  
 
The  differences  between  ARMs  held  for  long  periods  and  frequently 
refinanced  fixed-rate  loans  are  especially  apparent  when  non-price  lending 
conditions  tighten.  A  borrower  with  an  adjustable-rate  loan  is  immediately 
exposed to interest rate changes. If the fixed-rate borrower wants to refinance, 
however, they also have to meet current non-price lending conditions like LTV 
ratios. In contrast, if maximum LTV ratios are cut for adjustable-rate loans, 
existing borrowers are not affected, only new ones. Thus the US system is 
potentially more susceptible to tighter credit standards than those in countries 
where refinancing is less common.  
 
A further implication of inexpensive refinancing is that cash-out refinancing 
are also inexpensive. When households refinance more often, they have more 
opportunities to increase their loan balances than in systems where refinancing 
is comparatively rare. Amongst recent subprime (securitised) refinance loans, 
around  90  per  cent  involved  some  cashing  out  (Mayer  and  Pence  2008). 
Frequent cashing out implies that ongoing LTV ratios would be higher in the 
United States for a given initial LTV ratio.  
 
Frequent refinancing also means that more mortgages are originated based on 
appraisals rather than market prices. If appraised values of refinanced homes 
had been overstated compared with sale prices during the boom, refinancing 
borrowers  would  end  up  more  vulnerable  to  falls  in  market  prices.  Some 
evidence  of  appraisal  inflation  is  apparent  in  the  divergence  between  the 
OFHEO house price index including refinancing (based on appraised value) 
and the purchase-only index (Figure 9, right-hand panel). Moreover, these data 
refer  to  prime  loans  refinanced  by  the  GSEs;  if  the  figures  had  included 
subprime and other non-conforming mortgages, this difference would probably 
have been even larger.  
 
3.7  Structured Finance Enabled Subprime and Other Non-conforming 
Lending  
 
All securitisation markets face information asymmetries that can encourage lax 
lending  standards  (Ashcraft  and  Schuermann  2008).  Investors  in  MBS 
therefore  need  to  conduct  due  diligence  to  prevent  asymmetric  information 
turning  into  imprudent  lending.  In  the  recent  credit  boom,  however,  many 385    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
seemed content to rely on ratings rather than doing their own risk assessment 
of either the MBS or the structured securities based upon them.  
 
Analogously,  MBS  investors  also  relied  too  heavily  on  FICO  scores  as  an 
indicator  of  mortgage  borrower  creditworthiness.  This  provided  another 
incentive for originators to relax lending standards. As documented by Keys, 
Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2008), a score of 620 or above had traditionally 
been the threshold above which a mortgage would be eligible to be bought by 
the GSEs. The same threshold became the standard one for private-label (non-
GSE) securitisation as well. Therefore mortgage originators would know that if 
the borrower had a score of 620 or above, market practice implied that it was 
more likely that the loan could be securitised. Keys et al. (2008) show that 
lending  standards  were  noticeably  laxer  and  subsequent  loan  performance 
worse, slightly above the 620 threshold, compared with the mortgage loans 
where the borrower’s score was slightly below 620. Their findings provide 
direct evidence that lenders eased standards significantly if they thought the 
loan  was  likely  to  be  securitised,  which  implies  that  the  information 
asymmetries inherent in the securitisation process were not being corrected by 
investor due diligence in this period.  
 
Most securitisation deals contained “put-back” clauses that meant that lenders 
had to buy back early delinquencies out of the MBS structures. These clauses 
were  intended  to  give  mortgage  originators  the  incentive  to  lend  prudently 
(Gorton 2008), but the wave of bankruptcies of subprime lenders in late 2006 
and  early  2007  suggests  that  they  did  not  appreciate  how  risky  their  own 
lending  had  become.  Alternatively,  it  may  have  been  that  put-back  clauses 
were not a meaningful discipline on lenders that had no balance sheets of their 
own, and therefore had neither the capacity nor the intention to honour put-
backs.  
 
This  shift  in  underwriting  practices  occurred  at  the  same  time  as  credit 
conditions globally were relatively easy. Demand for structured credit products 
increased rapidly over the course of the decade; mortgages and MBS often 
served  as  the  underlying  assets  behind  these  products.  Loans  labeled  as 
subprime started to be securitised with increasing frequency (Mayer and Pence 
2008),  whereas  prior  to  the  lending  boom,  subprime  lenders  had  been  less 
likely to package their loans for securitisation than prime lenders (Crews Cutts 
and Van Order 2004).  
 
Demand for structured credit products did not just influence the behaviour of 
existing  mortgage  lenders.  It  seems  that  it  also  encouraged  entry  into  the 
market. In particular, many major US investment banks and some international 
ones acquired subprime lending subsidiaries during the boom’s run-up phase. 
As  providers  of  wholesale  funding  lines  for  other  lenders,  they  also 
encouraged existing lenders to enter new geographical markets. Dell’Ariccia et 
al. (2008) find that one driver of the deterioration in subprime (and to a lesser Ellis    386 
 
 
extent, prime) lending standards is the entry of some large national players into 
new local markets. The resulting increased competition encouraged incumbent 
lenders to ease their lending standards, with similar results to the easing by 
manufactured housing lenders some years earlier (Committee on the Global 
Financial System 2005). In contrast, there were fewer new entrants into the 
UK or Australian markets recently, for example, since these had already seen 
an increase in competition in the 1990s.  
 
This raises the deeper issue of why there were new entrants in US mortgage 
market  but  not  in  other  countries  to  the  same  extent.  While  the  investor 
appetite for asset-backed instruments encouraging the securitisation boom was 
global, it manifested itself the most in the market  where securitisation was 
used the most. Whether this was due to the size of the underlying mortgage 
market, its denomination in US dollars, or the willingness of lenders there to 
ease standards to meet that demand, is not immediately clear. However, many 
non-US issuers of RMBS did so in US dollars (and swapped the currency risk) 
without  seeing  the  same  decline  in  loan  quality.  This  suggests  that  the 
disproportionate rise in US-originated issuance may well have something to do 
with the willingness of US originators to ease underwriting standards.  
 
One reason why the strong demand for structured finance led to the structuring 
of specifically US-domiciled assets might have been that the externalisers of 
the credit risk were primarily US-domiciled entities such as municipal bond 
insurers (monolines). These entities were willing to insure the senior tranches 
of the structures more cheaply than other means of providing credit protection, 
including  over-collateralisation  and  traditional  mortgage  insurance  on  the 
underlying  mortgages,  which  remained  common  for  securitisations  in  other 
countries. In turn,  monoline  bond insurers  were concentrated in the United 
States  because  their  primary  business  in  the  municipal  bond  market  is 
concentrated there. In many other jurisdictions, higher-rated state and national 
governments underwrite local government bond issuance, or even raise funds 
on their behalf. The services of the monolines were therefore not required to 
the same extent outside the United States.  
 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks and Some Policy Lessons  
 
As has been pointed out many times elsewhere, the recent financial turmoil 
was propagated globally because of an increase in risk-taking. The problems in 
the  US  mortgage  market  could  just  be  seen  as  the  trigger  for  the  more 
generalised turmoil. By this view, the initial shock could easily have been from 
somewhere  else.  It  is  nonetheless  still  worth  asking  why  the  US  mortgage 
market was the trigger. Housing construction and prices have boomed in many 
countries of late. Other than in the United States, housing prices only began to 
fall in earnest, and arrears rates rise, once there was a shock external to the 387    The US Housing Meltdown 
 
 
housing  market,  such  as  a  macroeconomic  contraction  or  a  collapse  in 
mortgage credit supply.  
 
Many of these countries are arguably at least as far along in their housing 
cycles as the United States, or not much behind it, so this is probably not just a 
matter of lags; instead it suggests that the downswings have not had the same 
implications  for  housing  mortgage  arrears.  To  the  extent  that  that  housing 
markets have contracted in countries such as Ireland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom in the recent period, it has reflected the macroeconomic downturn, 
not instigated it: this is the opposite sequence of events to what happened in 
the United States, where rising arrears rates spurred tighter credit. Moreover, it 
seems very unlikely that some of the other features of the US meltdown – a 
substantial  oversupply  of  housing,  early  payment  defaults,  abuse  of  stated-
income loans and so on – will be seen to be significant in most other countries. 
The available evidence presented in this paper provides some support for the 
idea that this was a US-specific housing meltdown because the contributing 
factors all went further in the United States than elsewhere. Overbuilding of 
new housing, easier lending standards and the sensitivity of arrears rates and 
the incidence of negative equity to falling housing prices all seem to have been 
at least somewhat more pronounced in the United States.  
 
The  US  housing  construction  sector  seems  to  have  managed  to  build  up  a 
substantial oversupply of housing. The United States was therefore more likely 
to experience a sharp fall in prices than some other countries, even before 
credit supply tightened. Mortgage lending standards also eased more: only in 
the United States was there such a rapid expansion of subprime, no-deposit, 
stated-income, teaser and negative-amortisation mortgage products (sometimes 
all of these features in the one loan). Households were therefore more likely to 
fall into negative equity, and if they did, to default on their mortgages.  
 
On top of these proximate factors, though, the US housing–finance system was 
more sensitive to such an easing in credit standards. Geographic factors and 
the land-use planning system allowed builders to expand the housing supply 
more than elsewhere. The tax system encouraged households to maintain high 
ongoing LTV ratios, and the legal and regulatory systems enabled lenders to 
ease  standards  and  thereby  further  encourage  households  to  increase  their 
initial LTV ratios, and keep them high. Given all these factors working in the 
same direction and interacting with each other, the United States could well 
have experienced a painful bust and rising arrears rates, even if the easing in 
credit standards had not been greater than elsewhere.  
 
The recent distress in US mortgage markets has demonstrated the potential 
negative consequences of a temporary easing in lending standards. One lesson 
from this is that institutional differences shape the response to global financial 
developments, and the interaction between these institutional details can make 
a  large  difference  to  the  end  result.  In  countries  where  housing  supply  is 
especially flexible, and where tax and finance systems are very advantageous Ellis    388 
 
 
toward housing, an easing in credit standards on home mortgages might have 
particularly costly consequences, especially once standards tighten again. This 
might point  to the need  for  stricter regulation of  mortgage  underwriting in 
those countries compared with elsewhere, in order to prevent excessive easing 
of lending standards.  
 
As well as tighter regulation, authorities concerned with financial stability in 
countries with such an institutional setup need to be even more vigilant than 
their counterparts elsewhere in watching for signs of speculative imbalances in 
their housing markets. “Soft” signals, such as the presence of overt speculative 
activity,  or  the  availability  of  mortgage  products  that  the  borrower  cannot 
reasonably  sustain  over  its  full  life,  are  especially  useful.  Monitoring  of 
underwriting  standards  of  both  mainstream  and  fringe  lenders,  and  the 
importance of the latter in the market, is needed to make that assessment.  
 
Finally,  more  attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  institutional  differences  across 
countries when assessing their financial stability. The factors identified in this 
paper as contributing to the US housing meltdown were in many cases long-
standing institutional features, and were certainly not secrets. Why, then, did so 
many observers miss the United States’ greater vulnerability? We can probably 
do no more than speculate on the answer to this question, but the available 
literature covering the boom suggests that two cognitive biases were present. 
Much of the commentary on the US boom did not look further afield to notice 
how singular some US developments and institutions really were. Meanwhile 
much  of  the  cross-country  analysis  published  by  international  financial 
institutions and others was focused more on drawing out the common factors, 
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